Bovino v. Board of School Directors of Indiana Area School District 377 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Cwlth., 1977)
A definition of "cruelty" was provided by this Court in Caffas v. The Board of School Directors of the Upper Dauphin Area School District, 23 Pa.Cmwlth. 578, 582, 353 A.2d 898, 900 (1976).
Our definition is quite explicit and is as follows:
"[Cruelty is] the intentional and malicious infliction of physical suffering upon living creatures, particularly human beings; or, as applied to the latter, the wanton, malicious, and unnecessary infliction of pain upon the body, or the feelings and emotions; abusive treatment; inhumanity; outrage."
Obviously, the statements which Bovino made to the female student inflicted trauma and pain upon her person. She stated she was embarrassed and upset by Bovino's conduct. As noted in Caffas, supra, denials of intent to cause harm may be rejected if belied by the actor's demonstrated conduct. We agree that Bovino's actions also fall within the meaning of "cruelty."
We conclude that the provision of the Code listing causes for termination of a contract with a professional employe, specifically "cruelty" and "immorality", is not vague or indefinite.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the landmark case of Albert Appeal, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952), addressed itself to whether or not Section 1122 of the Code was unconstitutional because of vagueness and indefiniteness. The Court speaking through Chief Justice Stern noted that the causes for termination, namely, the terms "immorality" and "cruelty" were not vague or indefinite. Chief Justice Stern stated that, although exact and precise definitions of "immorality" and "cruelty" were illusory, their application to specific situations involved no real difficulty and that the courts of Pennsylvania have frequently upheld dismissals for "immorality" and "cruelty" under this section of the Code. Both the Commonwealth Court and the Supreme Court have provided definition, for "cruelty" and "immorality". Caffas, supra and Horosko, supra. A statute is not vague if a person of ordinary intelligence is capable of determining what conduct is proscribed. See Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission v. Dancer, 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 575, 578, 333 A.2d 196, 198 (1975). Bovino's conduct is obviously proscribed by Section 1122.