Joseph M. Petron v. Department of Education
726 A.2nd 1091 (PaCmwlth. 1999)

Facts of the Case

Joseph M. Petron, a certified music teacher, was accused of assaulting an
eleven year old student. Specifically, he was said to have grabbed the
student, banged him into a locker, and thrown him into a chair. Petron was
arrested on charges of simple assault and endangering the welfare of
children. The Pennsylvania School Code states that the Professional Standards
and Practices Commission has the power to suspend the teaching certificate
of any teacher indicted for a crime involving moral turpitude;
subsequently, the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) sought to have
Petron's certificate suspended.

Petron responded and maintained that, since the charge of endangerment was
dropped and the assault charge was no longer pending because he was
accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program, his
certificate should not be suspended. He also argued that suspension of
his certificate violated his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution
because he had been suspended without a hearing. PDE's contention was that
the assault charge was still pending and could be prosecuted should Petron
violate the ARD conditions and, therefore, the Commission should suspend
the certificate. PDE also asserted that the suspension did not violate the
teacher's rights. PDE requested a summary judgment which the Commission
granted on Nov.10, 1997, suspending Petron's teaching certificate. Petron
filed an application for reconsideration which the Commission denied, but
the Commission vacated its previous suspension of his certificate with the
stipulation that it be reinstated at the successful completion of the ARD
program.

Finally, Petron appealed to Commonwealth Court arguing that his
certificate should not be suspended as long as the assault charge was
postponed by his participation in the ARD process and that he was deprived
of his due process rights because the Commission did not provide him with a
meaningful hearing either before or after the suspension of his
certificate. Petron claimed that section 5(a)(11) of the Teacher
Certification Law, which requires the Commission to suspend a teacher's
certificate when the teacher has been indicted for a crime involving moral
turpitude, created an irrefutable presumption that he was unfit to teach.
He claimed that the Commission should be required to hold a hearing to
determine if his conduct warranted disciplinary action. PDE continued to
assert that the assault charge constituted moral turpitude until the time
that Petron actually completed the ARD program and that, therefore, the
suspension was valid.

Decision of the Court

The Court decided that Petron's due process rights had been violated and,
thus, reversed the decision of the Commission. Section 5(a)(11) of the
Teacher Certification Law, as applied to Petron, violated the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Basis for the Decision

The Court considered three factors in deciding if Section 5(a)(11) of the
Teacher Certification Law violated Petron's due process rights:

"... (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of such interest as
a consequence of the procedure used and the possible value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards; and (3) a balancing of the interest
served by the use of a summary procedure against the burden that would be
imposed by an additional, substitute or more rigorous procedure [citation
omitted]"(1094).

The Court reversed the Commission's decision to suspend Petron's teaching
certificate based on the educator's right to due process under the 14th
amendment to the Constitution. Petron's certificate, his means of earning
an income, is a constitutionally protected property right. Any action by
the Commission to remove this right must be either preceded or immediately
followed by a fair and meaningful hearing. Regardless of the disposition
of the criminal charges, the violation of Petron's rights negated the
suspension.

Sharon S. Miller and Judith E. Reese, July 8, 1999