Filed March 18, 2003

Facts of the Case

Kenna Williams was a Clearfield County Vocational-Technical School (CCVTS) employee for about 30 years. Williams served the last nine years as the Assistant Director of the school. His duties included advertising, writing specifications and reviewing the bids for computer purchases, a task with which he had experience and had no previous mishaps.

An anomaly in this process occurred on May 13, 1998. A bidder for some computers that were to be purchased, Linda Ward Craig, was present to submit a bid and then entered into a discussion with Williams. This discussion was about computers that did not meet the specifications and also cost about $150.00 less than computers that she could supply that met specifications. Also, Williams opened a bid from a different vendor in front of Craig and also discussed them with her. This had never occurred before a deadline at CCVTS, according to the chief officials recollection. The Joint Operating Committee (JOC) did not review the bids, and approved the bids for Pentium II computers from Craig’s company. It later came to light that the computers purchased were not the Pentium II computers that the bid originally specified. Craig later told the Executive Director of the school, Terry Horton, that Williams had altered the bid. The computers had to be upgraded at a cost of thousands of dollars.

Williams was given statement of charges and notice of hearing on charges of incompetency, immorality, willful neglect of duties and persistent and willful violation of or failure to comply with school policy. Eight hearings later, the JOC decided to terminate Williams on all charges except incompetency. Williams appealed the decision to the Secretary of Education. On January 3, 2002 the Secretary affirmed the decision of the JOC’s determination. Williams then appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Williams appeal was argued upon a lack of evidence to support dismissal on the charge of willful neglect of duties, persistent and willful violation of school laws and immorality. Williams also argued that the nearly two years between his hearing before a hearing officer and the Secretary’s decision violated his due process rights, and asked for damages, legal interest and award of counsel fees under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744.

Decision

The order of the Secretary of Education was affirmed by Commonwealth Court to terminate employment on the charges of immorality, willful neglect of duties and persistent and willful violation of school laws. Also, the decisions made by the Secretary were within the scope of the Secretary’s decision-making power. Finally, the time between hearings did not violate due process rights.

Basis for the Decision

A dictionary decision of neglect has been written as “1. to give little attention or respect to: Disregard 2: to leave undone or unattended to esp. through carelessness [.]” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 775 (10th ed.2001). A willful violation requires “the ‘presence of intention, and at least some power of choice.’” Cowdery v Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 531 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). No continuous course of conduct is required. The willful neglect occurred when he opened the bids before the noon deadline on May 13.

The argument that the Secretary’s decision concerning Craig’s testimony as the only source of evidence was improperly made was not valid. The Court explained that the “Secretary is the ultimate factfinder, with the power to determine the credibility of the witness” Also, Williams testimony and actions are aligned with Craig’s, as he testified he agreed with the less expensive computers Craig offered.

As for his due process rights being violated because of an unreasonable time for the Secretary to render a decision, Williams due process rights were determined to not have been violated. The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the delay harmed or prejudiced his or her interests. Ullo v. State Board of Nurse Examiners, 398 A.2d 764 (Pa Cmwlth. 1979). The delay does not prove by itself that he was harmed by the delay. Williams also does not contend that the delay harmed him in defending himself against the charges. See Ullo, 398 A.2d at 766.

Prepared by James Hudock Summer 2006