Bowalick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department
of Education
799 C.D. 2003 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
Facts of the Case
Andrew J. Bowalick, a teacher, was arrested after a domestic dispute with his
wife. Following the arrest, he pled guilty to simple assault and was sentenced.
The Pennsylvania Department of Education filed a notice of charges and a motion
for a summary judgment with the Professional Standards and Practices Commission
seeking revocation of Bowalick's teaching certificate on the basis that his
crime involved moral turpitude in accordance with 24 P.S. § 2070.9b(2).
Bowalick responded, acknowledging his guilty plea to the criminal charge, but
claiming that his actions were to avoid embarrassment to his family and himself.
He also argued that his actions were unrelated to moral turpitude and claimed
that the charges were filed by his wife to gain favor in a divorce proceeding.
The Commission granted the summary judgment and revoked Bowalick's certificate
without a hearing on the basis that the circumstances behind the guilty plea
were irrelevant because simple assault falls within the PA Code definition of
"moral turpitude."
Bowalick petitioned the Commonwealth Court for review of the Commission's order,
claiming that simple assault is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude.
Furthermore, Bowalick stated that the Commission denied him due process because
it did not hold an evidentiary hearing.
Decision of the Court
On January 8, 2004, the Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded the order of
the Professional Standards and Practices Commission that had revoked Bowalick's
teaching certification. The court concluded that the Commission had authority
to discipline the teacher but made an error in granting a summary judgment without
a hearing. The Commonwealth Court also asserted that simple assault is not necessarily
a crime of moral turpitude solely based on the definition of the crime.
Basis
The court based its decision upon the definition of moral turpitude in Title
22 of the Pennsylvania Code Section 237.9(a) and the definition of moral turpitude
in Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (7th Ed. 1999). The court also based its decision
upon the definition of simple assault in the Crimes Code, Section 2701 and the
close analysis of simple assault as a crime of moral turpitude. In its exploration
of these terms, the court discovered that there are many types of simple assault,
including a fight of mutual consent. In the context of a fight of mutual consent,
the elements of this type of simple assault do not necessarily satisfy the definition
of moral turpitude discussed in the regulations. Thus, the Commissions decision
was labeled "erroneous." According to precedent established in Davis
v. Department of Public Welfare 776 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) and Nolan
v. Department of Public Welfare 673 A.2d 414 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), the court
could not grant deference to the Commission's erroneous interpretation of the
regulation.
Prepared by Joseph E. Eglesia, July 1, 2004