Facts of the Case

On April 23 1997, the Lackawanna Trail School District suspended Pardue from her position as an elementary school teacher as a result of her arrest for criminal stalking and harassment. On August 25, 1997, the district converted her status to a suspension without pay. The district reported Pardue’s suspension to the Department of Education, which began proceedings to suspend her certificate. On October 30, 1997, the Professional Standards and Practices Commission suspended her teaching certificate. Pardue petitioned the court for review of the Commission’s suspension order but withdrew the appeal on March 17, 1998.

On May 12, 1999, Pardue was acquitted of criminal charges after a jury trial. On September 30, 1999, the Commission ordered Pardue’s teaching certificate be reinstated “immediately” but did not specify a date. The Department reinstated the certificate as of May 12, 1999, the date of her acquittal. Pardue did not file exceptions to the Commission’s order nor a petition for a review of the September 30, 1999 order.

Pardue made a demand for back pay for the entire period of her employment suspension including the time from October 30, 1997 to May12, 1999 when her teaching certificate was suspended. The district refused and Pardue filed a union grievance, which went to arbitration. On November 13, 2001, the arbitrator awarded Pardue back pay for the time periods her certificate had been in force but not for the period it was suspended, (i.e. October 29.1997 to May 12, 1999). Pardue did not petition to vacate the arbitrator’s reward but filed a petition for Clarification of the Order of September 30, 1999. The Commission denied the petition because it was untimely.

Decision of the Court

On January 31, 2003, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the order of the Department of Education, Professional Standards and Practices Commission that denied Pardue’s Petition of Clarification.

Basis for the Decision

The Commonwealth Court upheld the Commission’ denial of Pardue’s petition as untimely under the General Rules of Administrative Practices and Procedures, 1 Pa. Code 35.41, because she did not assert extraordinary circumstances justifying her failure to petition when due, which was fifteen days after entry of the Commission’s adjudication. The court rejected Pardue’s constitutional claim based on Petron v. Department of Education, 726 A. 2d 1091 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) and Slater v. Department of Education, 725 A. 2d 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), because her reliance on these cases was misplaced. She waived the constitutional issue by withdrawing her appeal on March 17, 1998. The court did not treat her petition for Clarification as a nunc pro tunc appeal, because she did not assert fraud, system negligence, or other extraordinary circumstances sufficient to find her failure to file a timely petition as non-negligent, Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa.256, 401 A. 2d 1133 (1979) ; West Penn Power Company v. Goddard, 460 Pa. 551, 333 A. 2d 909 (1975).

Prepared by Carol Caldwell, July 12, 2003.