Rich Bailey
CAPS 408- Legal Aspects of Education
April 29, 2002

Introduction

Brian B. along with seven of his classmates appealed the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a Pennsylvania statute on constitutional grounds. The statute limited the education available to youths convicted as adults and incarcerated in adult, county correctional facilities. They claimed that they did not receive the same education opportunities that other offenders have received in state and federal correctional facilities.

Background

Pennsylvania has a law that gives youths between the ages of 6-21 the right to a public education until they complete high school or a similar equivalence. Brian B. argued that he was not being allowed to get that education because he had been convicted of a crime and had been sentenced to a county institution instead of a federal institution.

The issue considered is whether it is fair that inmates who are sentenced to a state facility are given the opportunity to receive full education programs while inmates who are sentenced to serve time in a county facility are only provided the minimal education that is provided to expelled students. A student who is expelled and under the age of 17 has a right to only 5 hours per week of education compared to a normal 27.5 hours per week a student in regular schooling would receive. Also, an expelled student who is 17 or older is not entitled to any education. The placement of inmates is determined by the sentence they are serving: a person serving 2 years or less is placed in a county prison,a person serving 5 years or more is placed in a state prison, and someone serving in between 2-5 years is sentenced to serve where the judge decides to place them.

Decision

Brian B. and the other plaintiffs argued a couple of different points to show that the system was not treating them fairly. The first major point that they argued was that they were being punished as a result of their own illegal conduct that occurred outside the classroom and because of this they should not be treated like expelled students. They did nothing to violate school policy but yet they were being treated like they had been expelled, when in fact they had not yet been expelled.

They also argued that they were being singled out as one group because there are laws that are protecting other groups from being treated in this way. There are six groups to look at: school-age inmates; county incarcerated school-age inmates; state-incarcerated school-age inmates; pre-trial school-age detainees; school-age inmates requiring special education; and inmates of the juvenile detention system. Of these six groups only one, county incarcerated school-age inmates, is treated like expelled students. They argue that these inmates are most likely only serving up to 2 years of prison time and then they will be back in the general population and if they are not educated inside the prison then this is not good for rehabilitation. Most inmates in state prisons may be spending the rest of their life or a majority of their life behind bars but they continue to receive and education.

The courts used the rational basis test review to examine the case. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania tendered four justifications for the distinction the statute draws between county and state, adult institutions:

(1) Space limitations in county correctional institutions
(2) Higher per-student cost in county correctional institutions
(3) Security concerns that would arise in state correctional institutions if education were discontinued
(4) The greater need for education in state correctional institutions, independent of security concerns.

The Commonwealth argued that county correctional facilities in Pennsylvania do not have sufficient space to provide a complete education program. Under rational basis review a statute survives even if it is over-inclusive. Since the legislature has said that if space limitations in some county facilities justify the limitation on education, then that decision is not irrational. The Commonwealth also went on to say that the per-student cost is set by the legislature and they say that there are more youths in state prisons then there are in county facilities, and they must be given leeway to make some of these decisions and based on these statements they are still not breaking the rules.

The next point that the Commonwealth argued was that curtailing an already existing education program, like the ones in the state prisons, would raise security concerns. Finally the legislature believes that an offender's sentence in a county prison may be less than a school year whereas a state prisoner's sentence will be a lot longer than that so that makes it more important to educate the person who will be incarcerated the longest. The Commonwealth also brought up that a legislature's non-arbitrary judgment about educational priorities is not subject to judicial second-guessing.

On the basis of the evidence that has been presented and because Brian B. and the others had not shown a reasonable probability that the statute would be overturned, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion for preliminary injunction. The district court's order of June 17, 1999, was affirmed.

Dissenting Opinion:

One of the judges offered a dissenting opinion on the basis that Pennsylvania's treatment of this category of prisoners is arbitrary and violates equal protection.

He argued that although a state is not obligated to provide its citizens benefits such as education, when it elects to do so, it may not deny that benefit to some citizens for arbitrary reasons. He said that the state is allowing education to be curtailed arbitrarily. He also believes that an unpopular group is being singled out because out of the six groups that the plaintiffs named previously in the case, the youths incarcerated in county prisons were the only group that was treated as if they were expelled students. He also believes that the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) tries to articulate why it is willing to incur higher costs for some county inmates, but not for others. Again this goes back to violating equal protection. He also highlights a good point that the PDE is bringing up about the security risks of stopping the education in the state level prisons but that does not even apply to this case cause the Plaintiffs are not asking them to discontinue education at the state level.

It is in the opinion of this judge that the Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits they have brought up. He respectfully dissents and would remand this case to the District Court to have them review and see if the Plaintiffs satisfied other elements required for a preliminary injunction.