EDUC 432

Matt Sauer, Mark Rylak and Michael Kennedy

May 3, 1999

Jane Doe and Janet Doe vs. Claiborne County Tennessee, by and through Claiborne County Board of Education; and Dennis L. Peters; Roy L. Norris; Charles Randall Burchette; Bobby Williams; Dr. Roy Ellis. Jr.; J.P. Barnard; Lynn S. Barnard; in their individual and official capacities; and Sam Widener.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

No. 95-5050

This case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Jane Doe alleged that she suffered damages as a result of being sexually harassed, abused, and statutorily raped by a teacher, Jeffrey Davis. As a result, she brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Claiborne County, the board of education, and several board members and administrators of the school district. Doe sued the Caliborne County Board of Education and the county for sexual harassment in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments and brought a variety of state court claims. The district court dismissed Doe's 1983 claims, concluding that the school was not deliberately indifferent to her constitutional right to bodily integrity. The district court also dismissed the Title IX sexual harassment claim.

Jeffrey Davis's abuse of Doe began in the spring of 1991when she was a fourteen year-old freshman at Claiborne County High School. Davis was the boys' physical education teacher at a neighboring school, Soldier Memorial Middle School (SMMS), and the Claiborne County High School baseball coach. When the abuse began, Doe was the scorekeeper of the boys' baseball team, which Davis coached. In late March of 1992, Davis and Doe began having intercourse. Doe's aunts discovered her at Davis's house when his wife way away in December of 1992. Davis was then charged with six counts of statutory rape.

There were seven defendants named in the lawsuit filed by Doe. Bundren was the principal of Midway School where Davis was first suspected of misconduct in 1989 when he was accused of fondling a girl. Davis met with Bundren, Peters (the superintendent), and others. He was cleared of the charges and Bundren reported the results to Sam Widener, a member of the county board of education. In 1990, it was alleged that Davis had abused nine other girls. The Department of Human Services (DHS) was notified and investigated the reports. Davis was removed from contact with students for the remainder of the year while the investigation took place. DHS reported that four allegations were deemed "founded" and reported this to Peters, Widener, and other parties involved. Davis negotiated a pre-trial agreement with DHS in which: DHS would not pursue any criminal proceedings, DHS would not place his name on its registery, DHS would not take a role in the suspension of his teaching license but would notify school boards to which he may apply. Thereafter, Davis applied for a job at SMMS. Lynn Barnard, the principal, offered Davis a job at SMMS. When Davis began to explain the DHS charges, Barnard did not want to hear about them. Barnard stated he knew Davis had been removed from student contact but believed the DHS agreement had exonerated Davis. However, hearing rumors, Barnard closely observed Davis on several occasions. Also of importance, Peters was removed as superintendent of schools for misappropriating funds and rehired as a principal at Claiborne County High School.

In district court proceedings, Doe alleged that school administrators and the county had knowledge of Davis' sexual misconduct, which would violate her Fourteenth Amendment rights to safety, health and welfare. Doe claimed a Title IX violation because the school created a hostile sexual environment in which she was expected to learn. Furthermore, the Section 1983 claim stated that the school board had a tendency to ignore the unconstitutional behavior of its employees because it had rehired Peters who had been fired and Davis who had four "founded" cases of sexual abuse against him. Because the school board did not remove Davis from student contact and rehired him after the 1990-91 year, Doe felt her constitutional rights were violated.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims, stating that the administration showed no indifference to Doe's rights. This was because none of the customs dealt with sexual abuse. Also the court stated that the DHS agreement cleared the school board of wrongdoing because the agreement essentially exonerated Davis. The court dismissed the county as a party to the Title IX claim stating that Title VII agency principles do not apply to Title IX actions.

The court of appeals first addressed the dismissal of Doe's 1983 claim against the county and the school board. In this claim she argued that the school board had a custom of inaction towards the pattern of misconduct of its employees and that ignoring the misconduct showed a deliberate indifference to Doe's constitutional rights.

The municipal liability claim against the county and the school board was examined by applying a two-pronged inquiry. First, had Doe asserted the deprivation of a constitutional right? Second, was the county and/or school board responsible for that violation? Both questions had to be answered in the affirmative.

After having answered the first question in the affirmative, the court next considered whether the municipal defendants were responsible for that violation. Because Doe claimed that the custom, not policy, of ignoring misconduct failed to act to prevent sexual abuse it was very difficult for her to make a legitimate case. The court said that the board may have been reckless in its failure to inquire further into the allegations lodged against Davis but the evidence that Doe advanced did not show that the school board had a "custom" that reflected a deliberate, intentional indifference to the sexual abuse of students. Overall the court concluded that the board appropriately investigated Davis under its authority beforehand, and that even if they showed indifference to certain misbehavior, this did not mean that the school board showed indifference to sexual abuse.

Doe also asked the court to hold, as a matter of law, that the school board had a constitutional duty to protect her from Davis's sexual abuse. She said that this duty arose as a result of the "special relationship" created between her and the school district by Tennessee's in loco parentis statute. In most cases, the doctrine of in loco parentis has been largely abandoned. Here, they concluded that Tennessee's in loco parentis statute did not create a "special relationship" between Doe and the school board. Therefore, the due process clause did not impose an affirmative constitutional duty on the school board to assume the responsibility of protecting its students against the unconstitutional acts of its employees.

Doe sued the seven defendants claiming that the individual board members and school administrators were deliberately indifferent to the deprivation of her constitutional rights. She claimed that the defendants' inaction should subject them to liability. However, the court or appeals found that Doe failed to articulate what she expected the individual board members to do. Her arguments simply asserted that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her constitutional rights, but her assertion did not state a claim under Section 1983. Doe's claim could not be based on the fact that the defendants failed to report Davis's sexual abuse of her, because the defendants had no knowledge of any abuse.

Doe also asserted a claim against the school board on the basis of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. She claimed that Davis's sexual abuse amounted to sexual harassment under the statute, subjecting the school board to liability.

The final issue that was addressed was the challenge to the district court's decision to exclude all of Doe's notice evidence on the basis of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court of appeals concluded: "For the reasons explained, we affirm the dismissal of all section 1983 claims, reverse the decision dismissing plaintiffs' Title IX claim, reverse the decision to exclude the evidence on the basis of Rule 403, and remand with instructions that the district court proceed in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion."